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In this paper, I complicate the moral lives of patients,
specifically the mentally ill, and the moral burdens they
face when addressing one’s self-care in managing
chronic mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder. Much attention has been paid to the moral aspects of the doctor-patient relationship, and the moral responsibilities of doctors.
Bioethics, though, often limits its discussion of the moral responsibilities of patients. I will articulate how self-care is an opportunity for patients to take control over their morality.
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate that self-care is a
burdened virtue among the mentally ill. In this paper, self-care is
defined as a combination of three factors: 1) self-awareness of
current health status, 2) one’s place in the world, and 3) ability to
take action to promote one’s wellbeing through this awareness.
Additionally, I will argue for my points above using a conception
of the mentally ill as an oppressed group; for the sake of brevity, I
am going to assume this conception of the mentally ill, rather than
argue that it is true.
As I understand the mentally ill as an oppressed group, I
utilize Tessman’s work (Burdened V irtues) where she defined
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“burdened virtues” as those traits that help one obtain human
flourishing, but also detract and negatively impact the well-being
of one’s self, which inevitably lead to the chance of great pain
and suffering in the individual.I A burdened virtue both contributes to and inhibits human flourishing, especially for members of
oppressed groups.
Self-care is both enduring unchangeable factors associated
with the diagnosis and having the courage and fortitude to respond, along with an attempt to flourish under these factors. Mentally ill individuals experience well-documented hardships related
to their treatment. They also have deficiencies in self-awareness
in times of grave danger. Self-care provides mentally ill patients
the ability to act in their best interests at all times, but specifically
during times of instability. Self-care for a mentally ill patient is
not the same as a mentally healthy patient taking responsibility
for her health or acceptance of the sick role; the addition of selfcare complements patient responsibility.
To help discern why self-care is a virtue, and specifically
a burdened one, I will use the narrative of a schizophrenic patient
from a popular book, The Quiet Room by author and fellow patient advocate, Lori Schiller. I will explore the following three
questions: What is the nature of the virtue of self-care? What
would it look like to practice self-care? Why is the virtue of selfcare needed in the mentally ill population? Finally, I will compare self-care in two different populations, women who experience oppression and the mentally ill. In doing so, I will point to
the differences between the two, and also begin to explain why
self-care is a burdened virtue in the mentally ill, but one for oppressed women.
What is a Virtue?
As Aristotle defines it, virtue is the development of good
moral character. Such character is created, transformed, and refined by good or virtuous actions. Virtuous actions are seen to be
the comfortable middle between the opposing vices of excess and
deficiency.II Alasdair MacIntyre, in his modern approach to Aristotelian virtue, distinguishes internal versus external goods,
which can be associated with excellence versus effectiveness.III
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Internal goods are those that are gathered by the participation in
the practice whereas, external goods are just happenstance and
occur through random chance of the situation. In that, internal
goods can be considered goods of “excellence” and external
goods to be goods of “effectiveness”. To clearly understand what
virtues are and what they mean, it is imperative that a virtue is
displayed through a range of practices, with both internal and external goods. In addition, through those practices, critical assessments and other measures must be taken within the actual practice itself so as to ensure the virtue applies properly and an intended social purpose is met. For example, wastefulness is excessive spending of money and stinginess is the opposite; generosity
lies in the middle. Generosity is the center between giving just
enough while not inflicting self-harm via martyrdom by giving
everything away.IV
A virtue is defined by MacIntyre as an “acquired human quality where the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us
to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the
lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such
goods.”V MacIntyre’s beliefs can be summarized as a mechanism
where virtue results from both action and character in a cyclic
relationship where deliberation and rationality are central. This
virtue mechanism is required for maintaining a specific social
role and for excelling in a specific area of practice under that
role. By definition, practice is “any coherent and complex form
of socially established cooperative human activity through which
goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course
of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with
the results that human powers to achieve excellence, and human
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically
extended.”VI Therefore, virtues do not exist only out of actions
but as some culmination of actions, practice, and character. It is
important to note that both good character and good activities are
dependent on social, historical, and cultural contexts.
Inevitably, any trouble in this mechanism can result in outcomes such as poor cultivation of virtue, issues related to character, and the resulting actions of the individual. Furthermore, we
must note the difference between internal and external goods in
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relation to practice. As previously described, a practice is a complex, cooperative social activity where excellence can be
achieved through understanding of the goods involved in the activity. In continuation, external goods, are related to a competition where there are winners and losers. However, these are just
objects that seem beneficial but do not improve one’s virtue. In
contrast, internal goods are based on the outcome of the competition and the benefit of the achievement to the entire community.
Two key points are crucial to remember: first, the acquisition of
virtues is a means to an end. Second, that relationship is one of
internal, rather than external, goods.
The Nature of Self-Care as a Virtue
To understand how a virtuous patient should engage modern psychiatry, one must notice that the practice of medicine is
dependent on social and historical forces. Thus, the patient suffering from mental illness cannot be separated from the social and
historical forces that created both the conception of mental illness, nor from the related forces that created the mentally healthy
patient. Patients enacting self-care are working through the practice of medicine via the patient-provider relationship. In schizophrenia, patients often go through waves of their disorder, including the active phase known as the hallucinations, delusions, and
disturbance in their thoughts and feelings; while they also can go
through periods of passive, less symptomatic schizophrenia.
Often, the mentally ill patient is thought to have failed or
is deemed incapable of being responsible for herself, in attending
to her physical, mental, and moral well-being. As an example,
consider the work of Lori Schiller, a psychiatric patient challenged with the burden of her illness and the challenges that follow. An excerpt from an interview with Lori Schiller states:
People would say to me, 'Why do you want to kill yourself? Are you depressed?' More than anything else I wanted relief. I couldn't listen anymore. I could see those faces
on the walls laughing at me or telling me I had to die. VII
Furthermore, her life still comes with a price. She is constantly
aware of her illness, has to manage her medications, and has to
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cope with a variety of responses from individuals who attend her
book signings or other public events. These responses can be particularly challenging when she encounters individuals who have
misconceptions about schizophrenia or her experiences living
with a mental illness.VIII Elsewhere, Schiller discusses how her
suicidal ideations often kept her calm and centered because it followed what the Voices wanted her to do. She begins by saying:
“As frightening as these potential suicidal scenarios seem, they
are all held for me a real ending of tranquility and eternal peace.”
She precedes this by discussing how she received her diagnosis:
Eventually, I entered the ‘revolving door’ into the socalled mental health system. The doctors, so dapper and
professional in their psychiatric style and attire, told my
parents that I was a paranoid schizophrenic who had little
chances of getting better. My diagnosis was just another
‘sick chronic psychiatric patient’ to be shoved away forever in some hospital. IX
Moving forward, we should recognize that these scenarios are but
two examples of what schizophrenia patients might cope with as
part of their diagnosis. Through these examples, the virtue of self
-care will be explored.
Here, it is helpful to clarify the nature of self-care, particularly in contrast to other standard virtues with which patients
might engage. Above, I defined self-care as a combination of self
-awareness of current health status and place in the world, along
with the ability to take action to promote one’s wellbeing through
this awareness.
Self-care is not “responsibility for self.” Responsibility is
based on a person’s intentions, whether voluntary or involuntary.
Moral responsibility is too much for the mentally ill. Furthermore, a person is responsible for their character because a person
develops their character through their actions.X Responsibility is
a process that occurs when acting as a normal agent. The mentally ill are often unable to take complete legal or moral responsibility and are unable to act as a legal or moral agent. Thus, the virtue of responsibility does not fit the need required by this group
and is rather unattainable for them.
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Due to this, self-care is a virtue that can be achieved by
the mentally ill, versus responsibility for self, which requires
agency that might not always be achieved in this population. Selfcare is more manageable for the mentally ill than responsibility;
although it is weaker than the virtue of responsibility, it is still an
important virtue.
Furthermore, self-care is not reducible to “prudence.” Prudence can be defined as a reluctance to take risks or overcautiousness; it also can be termed as rational choice or practical
wisdom. Prudence is the ability to govern and discipline oneself
by the use of reason. Likewise, it also incorporates a course of
action that is related to perfection of ability. To explain, without
prudence, virtue is practically impossible because a balance is
unattainable. Self-care is a different virtue than prudence because
prudence lends too much towards perfection and an absolute balance without being too cautious or too practical. Self-care is
about self-awareness and the ability to act for an individual’s best
interest, whether or not it is practiced in too practical or too cautious a method.
In The Rules of Insanity, Carl Elliott discusses the differences
between ignorance and compulsion and how that relates to the
responsibility of an individual. Ignorance is defined as a person
not being aware of their actions, whereas compulsion is defined
as a person not being able to help what he or she is doing. In a
schizophrenic patient, often the individual lacks awareness of his
or her actions, which means that he or she also is not in control of
character because of the inability to rationalize and deliberate.
In this mechanism, based on MacIntyre’s previously-defined
theory of practice, it seems impossible for a mentally ill person to
be virtuous. Prudence suggests that the person must perceive and
understand the situation appropriately and further act on behalf of
that perception. The perception and judgement required are already in question in responsibility, but in prudence, character is
more than just the sum of actions. Mental illnesses, especially
schizophrenia, stunt a person’s ability to advocate and determine
what is best for one’s personal welfare. This negates any possible
self-protectiveness, especially in regards to the virtue of prudence.XI
The mentally ill have no opportunity to achieve the flourish-
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ing associated with the virtues of responsibility and prudence. If
living is about the ability to experience emotional connections,
responsibility, flourishing, and other internal goods related to the
virtue of self-care, then, the mentally ill do not have the opportunity to follow the definition of human flourishing with those
virtues. This is because the patient is unable to practice the virtue
of self-responsibility or prudence properly due to his or her illness. This does not mean these individuals are incapable of practicing self-care or other virtues; it means that the practice of selfcare and related virtues rely on the development of multiple social identities in an individual, and intermingle depending upon
the current mental state. This kind of care-taking is beyond the
scope of medical professionals or family members. Instead, it is
about the individual and her understanding and perception of the
limitations of illness.
Self-Care Enacted
The practice of self-care is challenging to achieve in practice, as is true with most of Aristotle’s virtues. As previously described, self-care is defined as a combination of self-awareness of
current health status and place in the world along with the ability
to take action to promote one’s well-being through this awareness. For example, self-care in the mentally ill could be patients
taking the initiative to discuss medication side effects they are
experiencing with their providers and, further, having an open
conversation about what can be done in the future to prevent
those side effects, whether through discontinuation of the medication (safely) or counseling services. In many cases, individuals
may feel that they are betraying themselves by having those open
conversations, in particular the case of schizophrenia, where voices may be telling them to do otherwise.
Honoring oneself is related to recognition and giving reasoning for choices and emotions.XII It is extremely difficult to
maintain personal honor while also sacrificing oneself through
the burdened virtue of self-care. To clarify: honoring oneself is
completely separate from self-care, but I will use the nature and
practice of honoring oneself to further understand the virtue of
self-care. Self-care, in contrast, is not at all about recognition but
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rather about self-respect and preservation of the self through alternative and preventative methods such as plans for “bad” days
for loved one to follow or additional friendships and connections
to maintain the “good” mental health status rather than a spiral
downwards. Self-care in psychiatric patients enables actions to
take place even when they might not be able to honor themselves
because a specific level of awareness and rationality is not being
reached. Therefore, they must practice self-care, which entails
putting responsibility and care in the hands of those trusted and
respected to make decisions on behalf of the individual. This can
further help to limit the damage that can ensue from their inability to practice self-honor. Self-care also is about understanding
the various levels of involvement required for proper psychiatric
care. This includes therapists, doctors, family members, and social workers as part of the treatment regimen and allowing open
communication networks between any and all of these people.
Another important distinction of self-care is that self-care
is a particular obligation that mentally ill patients owe themselves. The repetitive nature of chronic mental illness requires a
significant amount of endurance. The virtue of self-care can help
prevent further hospitalizations and better mental health outcomes. Thus, interestingly, virtues-including self-carehave a great
social benefit.
Being mentally ill does not require the patient to be selfsacrificing, but rather the illness creates difficulties for the individual and health care professionals interacting with these individuals. If psychiatric patients choose not to practice self-care,
they are cheating themselves out of the life they are guaranteed.
In addition, self-care is about the realization of one’s own obligations to oneself and the recognition of the work one has to do so
that others may help. A common question could be, does a severely mentally ill patient, such as a schizophrenic, have autonomy or rational decision-making skills? This balancing act is hard
enough in a healthy patient, but once a psychiatric patient is
tasked with understanding various facets of human character and
related actions, the challenge of virtuous actions can become
overwhelming and further perpetuate a struggle for human excellence in a psychiatric patient. Therefore, the actual virtue of selfcare eliminates some of the baggage associated with other virtues
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(such as prudence and responsibility). Self-care is practiced when
the patient is autonomous and able to make competent decisions
whereas self-care is enacted when the patient is unable to act for
one’s best interests.
Self-Care as a Burdened Virtue: Differences in the Mentally
Ill and Women
How is self-care enacted in other groups facing oppression, as women, different from its enactment by mentally ill patients? Oppression is the use of authority, law, or physical force,
in an inequitable manner, to prevent others from being free and
equal; a systematic mistreatment of a targeted group.XIII Identity
is something that is unchosen, however, it also is about who we
are as individuals in relation to everyone else.XIV Self-care among
women is about taking action and claiming responsibility over
their environments and identities in order to gain autonomy and
independence as women. In contrast, self-care in the mentally ill
is about understanding the different realms of mental stability and
lucidness associated with the illness and developing skills to act
properly in those different realms, especially in circumstances
where self-sufficiency is not possible due to the lack of choice in
mental illness.XV
The practice of self-care is different for women and the mentally ill. A woman who is constantly undergoing inappropriate
scrutiny by her male coworkers can go to her human resources
department and report the coworkers; in this, she is taking action
not only for her benefit but also for all women. Oppression, remember, works to cause harm to both the individual woman, and
because of its systemic quality, women as a group or category.
Alternatively, the act of reporting the event or whistleblowing
could negatively impact her career by potentially leading to a demotion (or lack of promotion). Another example is standing up
for women’s health and reproductive rights. Though this is fueled
by political and religious controversy, the root of the situation is
still about women’s health and the right she has over her own
body. By addressing topics such as free contraceptives, women
that actively discuss this with other women or the media, are acting virtuously through self-care and maintaining their identity and
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rights as women. However, women who bring attention to this
issue in an unjust manner can cause strife and further violence or
discrimination of women.
For someone who has schizophrenia, developing an action
plan for an alternate social identity can be self-care. Specifically,
Lori Schiller knew she had schizophrenia and decided not to tell
anyone for quite some time. This is going against self-care because she, as a mentally ill patient, has an obligation to practice
self-care and to advocate for herself when she is able to do so. If
not, she is inhibiting her ability to flourish as a human being because she is not pursuing a virtuous life. When she finally told
someone, Schiller was able to release some autonomy, ensuring
that when she was unable to take proper actions for herself, someone would be able to act in her best interest. This is a problem
that often affects schizophrenics because they are unsure whether
they have individual autonomy because the illness makes them
feel otherwise.
At the same time, by asking for help, Schiller was able to start
connecting with others. This small step was part of a much bigger
step in social support, which is self-care. She also could have
practiced self-care by telling her family members and friends
about her illness and symptoms sooner than she did. The education and knowledge could have prevented one of her many suicide attempts and also could have taught those close to her about
schizophrenia so they could help to reduce the stigma and weight
she had to bear. Each of these examples demonstrates a way that
she could have developed a social identity capable of handling
the worst of her schizophrenia while also developing another social identity that allows her to take part in advocating for both
herself and other mentally ill people. But how does involving others contribute to the virtue of self-care? Through the nature of self
-awareness and, therefore, the actions made to benefit oneself,
reaching out to trusted individuals grants the mentally ill a specific level of autonomy in hard situations; that is the virtue of selfcare.
With all of this, where is self-care? It is part of both action
and character, but also connected to rationality and deliberation.
Self-care is impossible for an individual to enact as a virtue, to
help survive that oppression, without also negatively influencing
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her own well-being, given that self-care is a burdened virtue. The
most engaged struggle around the virtue of self-care is separating
it from being self-regarding, and therefore not a virtue at all. As
Tessman argues in Burdened V irtues, self-concern may not be
considered morally virtuous because a virtue is supposed to be
other-regarding rather than self. The difference between selfconcern and self-care is that, in self-care, the mentally ill patient
is directly associated with providing evidence, support, and education for others to then assist in taking care of said mentally ill
person. If Lori Schiller had educated, say, her close friends about
her wishes for when her schizophrenia went into an active stage,
they would be able enact her best interests. This serves both the
good of other’s well-being and her own. In acting with self-care,
Schiller would have been self-aware of her current health status
by educating her friends and then she would have taken action to
promote her own well-being by developing a plan for when her
schizophrenia is active.
Conclusion

In conclusion, self-care is combination of self-awareness of
current health status and place in the world, along with, the ability to take action to promote one’s wellbeing through this awareness. This is accomplished by the education, compassion, and
caring which someone provides for the mentally ill individual.
Self-care is more than just bodily care, and self-care is beyond
responsibility or prudence. Self-care is a burdened virtue that acts
in self-preservation for both the individual and the mentally
healthy population. Self-care is different than personal responsibility for individual health. Self-care as a burdened virtue has two
facets. First, self-care is the attempt to thrive despite oppressive
factors associated with a diagnosis. Second, self-care allows mentally ill patients to develop the actions and enact those actions
necessary to take responsibility and better their lives as well as
other members of the group.
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